Footprints in the Sand: British Colonial Counterinsurgency and the War in Iraq

Daniel Branch
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Daniel Branch: University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, d.p.branch@warwick.ac.uk

Politics & Society, 2010, vol. 38, issue 1, 15-34

Abstract: Recent attempts to revive counterinsurgency strategies for use in Afghanistan and Iraq have been marked by a determination to learn lessons from history. Using the case of the campaign against the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya of 1952—60, this article considers the reasons for this engagement with the past and the issues that have emerged as a consequence. The article disputes the lessons from British colonial history that have been learned by military planners, most obviously the characterization of nonmilitary forms of British counterinsurgency as nonviolent. Although it contests some of these supposed precedents for successful counterinsurgency in British military history, the article also identifies more generalizable elements of the Kenyan case. Particular emphasis is given to the effects on the nature of counterinsurgency, a reliance on locally recruited allies, and the decentralization of command.

Keywords: counterinsurgency; Kenya; Iraq; Mau Mau; British colonialism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:38:y:2010:i:1:p:15-34

DOI: 10.1177/0032329209357882

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