Parallel Paths to Enforcement

Salo V. Coslovsky and Richard Locke
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Salo V. Coslovsky: New York University, New York
Richard Locke: Brown University

Politics & Society, 2013, vol. 41, issue 4, 497-526

Abstract: In recent years, global corporations and national governments have been enacting a growing number of codes of conduct and public regulations to combat dangerous and degrading work conditions in global supply chains. At the receiving end of this activity, local producers must contend with multiple regulatory regimes, but it is unclear how these regimes interact and what results, if any, they produce. This article examines this dynamic in the sugar sector in Brazil. It finds that although private and public agents rarely communicate, let alone coordinate with one another, they nevertheless reinforce each other’s actions. Public regulators use their legal powers to outlaw extreme forms of outsourcing. Private auditors use the trust they command as company insiders to instigate a process of workplace transformation that facilitates compliance. Together, their parallel actions block the low road and guide targeted firms to a higher road in which improved labor standards are not only possible but even desirable.

Keywords: labor standards; private auditors; labor inspectors; global supply chains; Brazil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:41:y:2013:i:4:p:497-526

DOI: 10.1177/0032329213507550

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