No Taxation of Elites, No Representation
Deborah Boucoyannis
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Deborah Boucoyannis: University of Virginia
Politics & Society, 2015, vol. 43, issue 3, 303-332
Abstract:
Does state weakness lead to representation via taxation? A distinguished body of scholarship assumes that fiscal need forced weak(ened) states to grant rights and build institutions. The logic is traced to pre-modern Europe. However, the literature has misunderstood the link between state strength and the origins of representation. Representation emerged where the state was already strong. In pre-modern Europe, representation originally was a legal obligation, not a right. It became the organizing principle of central institutions where rulers could oblige communities to send representatives authorized to commit to decisions taken at the center. Representation thus presupposed strong state capacity, especially to tax. The revision amends our understanding of the historical paradigms guiding the literature, as well as the application of these paradigms to policies in the developing world. It suggests that societal demands for accountability and better governance (the assumed aims of representation) are more likely to emerge in response to taxation already effectively applied.
Keywords: constitutionalism; taxation; bargaining; representation; historical institutionalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:43:y:2015:i:3:p:303-332
DOI: 10.1177/0032329215584765
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