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Capital Strikes as a Corporate Political Strategy: The Structural Power of Business in the Obama Era

Kevin A. Young, Tarun Banerjee and Michael Schwartz
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Kevin A. Young: University of Massachusetts Amherst
Tarun Banerjee: University of Pittsburgh
Michael Schwartz: Stony Brook University

Politics & Society, 2018, vol. 46, issue 1, 3-28

Abstract: The importance of overt levers of business political influence, notably campaign donations and lobbying, has been overemphasized. Using executive branch policymaking during the Obama administration as a case study, this article shows that those paths of influence are often not the most important. It places special emphasis on the structural power that large banks and corporations wield by virtue of their control over the flow of capital and the consequent effects on employment levels, credit availability, prices, and tax collection. At times, business disinvestment, combined with demands for government policy reforms, constitutes a conscious “capital strike,†which has the potential to shape political appointments, legislation, and policy implementation. At other times, the threat of disinvestment, the hint of a drop in “business confidence,†or rhetoric about job creation is sufficient to achieve those objectives. The present analysis has important implications for our understanding of political power and social change in capitalist economies.

Keywords: structural power; capital strike; business confidence; financial reform; Wall Street (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:46:y:2018:i:1:p:3-28

DOI: 10.1177/0032329218755751

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