EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Multilevel Politics of Enforcement: Environmental Institutions in Argentina

Belén Fernández Milmanda and Candelaria Garay
Additional contact information
Belén Fernández Milmanda: Trinity College
Candelaria Garay: Harvard University

Politics & Society, 2020, vol. 48, issue 1, 3-26

Abstract: Environmental protection presents a challenge for commodity-producing democracies. To account for the enforcement of environmental laws in decentralized systems, this article proposes a multilevel approach that highlights the importance of national laws and subnational implementation rules to the politics of enforcement. This approach contrasts with prominent scholarship that focuses on sanctions and the electoral incentives and bureaucratic resources of enforcers. The advantages of the multilevel approach are demonstrated by the enforcement of the native forest protection regime (NFPR) in the Argentine Chaco Forest, which is shaped not only by whether sanctions on illegal deforestation are applied by subnational authorities but also by the design of both the national law and subnational regulations. The article employs quantitative data and case studies based on extensive fieldwork to show how affected subnational organized interests influenced the design of the NFPR and the provincial regulations that weaken or strengthen enforcement.

Keywords: deforestation; Latin America; enforcement; environmental politics; agricultural producers; conservationists (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032329219894074 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:48:y:2020:i:1:p:3-26

DOI: 10.1177/0032329219894074

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Politics & Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:48:y:2020:i:1:p:3-26