Loyalists, Localists, and Legibility: The Calibrated Control of Provincial Leadership Teams in China

David J. Bulman and Kyle A. Jaros
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David J. Bulman: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Kyle A. Jaros: School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford

Politics & Society, 2020, vol. 48, issue 2, 199-234

Abstract: Selecting provincial leaders is a fraught task for authoritarian regimes. Although central authorities more readily trust provincial leaders with close ties to the center, such loyalists may lack the local knowledge and connections necessary to govern adeptly. Using an original data set on the tenures and backgrounds of China’s provincial party standing committee members, this article explores how Beijing fine-tunes provincial leadership teams to resolve this dilemma. The analysis challenges the conventional wisdom that Beijing exerts its tightest personnel control in strategically important provinces. It shows that Beijing tolerates significant embeddedness of local leadership in provinces with complex governance challenges even when these provinces are important. Moreover, it finds that when the center reasserts control through appointments of loyalist personnel during times of crisis, it does so in a balanced manner. These calibrated personnel strategies highlight the extent to which authoritarian systems rely on local expertise and experience as well as top-down control.

Keywords: China; personnel management; central-local relations; authoritarian regimes; legibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:48:y:2020:i:2:p:199-234

DOI: 10.1177/0032329220908691

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