Suppression by Stealth: The Partisan Response to Protest in State Legislatures

Chan S. Suh and Sidney G. Tarrow
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Chan S. Suh: Chung-Ang University
Sidney G. Tarrow: Cornell University

Politics & Society, 2022, vol. 50, issue 3, 455-484

Abstract: Many scholars have investigated the relationship between protest and repression. Less often examined is the legislative suppression of protest by elites seeking to make protest more costly to protesters. Because state legislatures are largely invisible to the public, this “wholesale†suppression of protest is less likely to trigger public opposition than repression by the police. This study explains the sharp increase in the number and the severity of state legislative bills to repress the right to protest both before and after the election of Donald Trump. In particular, it examines whether these can be attributed either to Republican control of state legislatures or to protest threat. Contrary to the findings in much of the literature, bills aimed at suppressing protest are less closely related to threat than to the realignment of state politics. The article also finds that these proposals were influenced by diffusion through policy brokerage.

Keywords: protest threat; repression; state legislatures; policy brokerage; ALEC (American Legislative Exchange Council) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:50:y:2022:i:3:p:455-484

DOI: 10.1177/00323292211039956

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