Anything but Inevitable: How the Marshall Plan Became Possible

David M. McCourt and Stephanie L. Mudge

Politics & Society, 2023, vol. 51, issue 4, 463-492

Abstract: Historians typically explain the Marshall Plan (1948–52) as an effect of a bipartisan embrace of liberal internationalism, which became the dominant ideology of US foreign policy. However, predominant accounts downplay interpretive contention, historical contingencies, and counterfactual possibilities that are very much in evidence. There was no bipartisan liberal internationalist consensus immediately after World War II; indeed, there were no “liberal internationalists†until 1947 . The present analysis identifies two interconnected processes behind the Plan: the emergence of a new kind of political actor , the credibly anti-Communist New Deal liberal, and the coalescence of an unlikely coalition of Trumanites, New Dealers, and congressional conservatives. Together, these processes enabled the passage of a large-scale, Keynesian-style spending initiative that excluded Russia, despite the electoral weakness of New Dealers, and the consolidation of liberal internationalist ideology in American foreign policy—with significance for today's era of renewed great power competition.

Keywords: Marshall Plan; United States; US foreign policy; liberal internationalism; political persons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:51:y:2023:i:4:p:463-492

DOI: 10.1177/00323292221094084

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