Republican freedom and the rule of law

Christian List

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2006, vol. 5, issue 2, 201-220

Abstract: At the core of republican thought, on Philip Pettit’s account, lies the conception of freedom as non-domination, as opposed to freedom as noninterference in the liberal sense. I revisit the distinction between liberal and republican freedom and argue that republican freedom incorporates a particular rule-of-law requirement, whereas liberal freedom does not. Liberals may also endorse such a requirement, but not as part of their conception of freedom itself. I offer a formal analysis of this rule-of-law requirement and compare liberal and republican freedom on its basis. While I agree with Pettit that republican freedom has broader implications than liberal freedom, I conclude that we face a trade-off between two dimensions of freedom (scope and robustness) and that it is harder for republicans to solve that trade-off than it is for liberals.

Keywords: freedom; republicanism; liberalism; noninterference; non-domination; rule of law; robustness; liberal paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:5:y:2006:i:2:p:201-220

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X06064222

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