Republican freedom and the rule of law

Christian List

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: At the core of republican thought, on Philip Pettit’s account, lies the conception of freedom as non-domination as opposed to freedom as non-interference in the liberal sense. I revisit the distinction between liberal and republican freedom and argue that republican freedom incorporates a particular rule-oflaw requirement, whereas liberal freedom does not. Liberals may also endorse such a requirement, but not as part of their conception of freedom itself. I offer a formal analysis of this rule-of-law requirement and compare liberal and republican freedom on its basis. While I agree with Pettit that republican freedom has broader implications than liberal freedom, I conclude that we face a trade-off between two dimensions of freedom – scope and robustness – and that it is harder for republicans to solve that trade-off than it is for liberals.

JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Politics, Philosophy & Economics, June, 2006, 5(2), pp. 201-220. ISSN: 1470-594X

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Journal Article: Republican freedom and the rule of law (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:5824

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