Tiebout Competition, Yardstick Competition, and Tax Instrument Choice: Evidence from Ohio School Districts

Joshua Hall and Justin Ross

Public Finance Review, 2010, vol. 38, issue 6, 710-737

Abstract: Previous research has shown that Tiebout-style fiscal competition among local governments reduces the likelihood of adopting income taxes. This literature has not yet considered the impact of yardstick competition on tax instrument choice. This article uses spatial econometrics to test for yardstick competition in the decision to adopt an income tax. The results, based on Ohio school district data, indicate that school districts are more likely to adopt an income tax if their neighbors have already done so. While a negative correlation of Tiebout competition on district income tax adoption persists, controlling for spatial dependence reduces the statistical significance of the effect.

Keywords: interjurisdictional competition; tax structure; education finance; yardstick competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1091142110373479 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:38:y:2010:i:6:p:710-737

DOI: 10.1177/1091142110373479

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().