Strategic Tax Planning for State Tax Amnesties

Justin Ross and Neal D. Buckwalter

Public Finance Review, 2013, vol. 41, issue 3, 275-301

Abstract: Tax amnesty programs have exploded in popularity among cash-strapped states since the beginning of the Great Recession. Though many scholars have been interested in the long-term tax compliance effects after amnesty programs, this article is the first to consider short-run compliance effects just prior to a known amnesty—a moral hazard effect leading to strategic delinquencies. Evidence of this is detected from year-over-year tax revenue change in quarters just prior to an amnesty program. Regression analysis on pre-amnesty periods for state tax amnesty programs between 1982 and 2011 indicates that states experience higher pre-amnesty revenues when recent delinquents are excluded from amnesty participation. The point estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) indicated that about 4.3 to 6.4 percent of an average amnesty’s recovery came from strategically delayed payments, whereas IV/2SLS put the range at 12.9 to 16.5 percent.

Keywords: tax amnesty; tax planning; tax delinquency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:41:y:2013:i:3:p:275-301

DOI: 10.1177/1091142112461687

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