Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States

Per Fredriksson and Khawaja Saeed Mamun

Public Finance Review, 2014, vol. 42, issue 1, 4-34

Abstract: This article investigates whether reputation-building strategies may guide US governors’ state cigarette tax choices and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975–2000 data, we find evidence indicating that governors are prone to engage in reputation building, in particular in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.

Keywords: agricultural tobacco; cigarette taxation; lobbying; reputation-building; electoral accountability; term limits; federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:42:y:2014:i:1:p:4-34

DOI: 10.1177/1091142112463045

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