Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States

Per Fredriksson and Khawaja Saeed Mamun

No 2009003, Working Papers from Sacred Heart University, John F. Welch College of Business

Abstract: This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ state cigarette tax choices, and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975-2000 data, we find evidence that governors in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production and tobacco manufacturing, and which are densely populated by smokers, appear prone to reputation-building. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.

Keywords: Agricultural tobacco, cigarette taxation, lobbying, reputation-building; electoral accountability; term limits; federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:she:wpaper:2009003

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