Corporate Control, Social Choice and Capital Accumulation: An Asymmetrical Choice Approach

Christos Pitelis

Review of Radical Political Economics, 1986, vol. 18, issue 3, 85-100

Abstract: Corporate decisions with regard to retained earnings act as a constraint to the consumption-saving decisions of all shareholders, except those who take the decisions - the controlling group. The latter exhibit a preference for a higher retention ratio than the non-controlling share-holders and tend to realize their "preferences." Given less than perfect substitution between corporate and personal saving, this tends to increase aggregate financial capital accumulation.

Date: 1986
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Working Paper: CORPORATE CONTROL, SOCIAL CHOICE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: AN ASYMMETRICAL CHOICE APPROACH (1983)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:18:y:1986:i:3:p:85-100

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