Breaking the Myth of Harmony: Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines to the Study of Rural Third World Households

Elizabeth Katz
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Elizabeth Katz: Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin - Madison, 432 Kentucky Avenue SE, Washington, D.C. 20003

Review of Radical Political Economics, 1991, vol. 23, issue 3-4, 37-56

Abstract: Conventional neoclassical models of the household fail to account for the conflict and negotiation inherent in these fundamental economic units. The recent incorporation of game-theoretic notions of "bargained" decision-making into these models neglects gender as a defining feature of household economics. This paper develops an alternative feminist model of the household in which gender-based differentials in the access to key economic and noneconomic resources condition the formation of household economic goals, the allocation of labor and income to competing uses, and the welfare outcomes of household economic activities for all household members.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:23:y:1991:i:3-4:p:37-56

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