Escaping the Fate of Sisyphus: Bargaining, Divorce, and Employment in the Patriarchal Family

Julia A. Heath and David H. Ciscel
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Julia A. Heath: Dept. of Economics, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152
David H. Ciscel: Dept. of Economics, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152

Review of Radical Political Economics, 1996, vol. 28, issue 1, 1-19

Abstract: A radical bargaining approach, the Sisyphus Syndrome paradigm, is offered as an alternative to the neoclassical treatment of women's labor force participation and divorce incidence. In this paradigm, women who do not participate in the wage system remain in marriages because of the dearth of viable alternatives. The results from a simultaneous equation model, using data from first and second marriages, support the Sisyphus Syndrome paradigm, and offer a more realistic alternative to the traditional treatments of family behavior.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:28:y:1996:i:1:p:1-19

DOI: 10.1177/048661349602800101

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