Winner-Take-a-Hike Markets: The Arrogant Agent Problem in a Model of Devious Colleague Selection

Alan Day Haight

Review of Radical Political Economics, 2003, vol. 35, issue 3, 241-247

Abstract: To protect their office rank and “strutils' (which are utils obtained by strutting around the office), the senior professionals in a law firm or academic department sometimes resort to devious prescreening of job applicants, passing over the best candidates. This practice is more tempting for a hiring professional who is wealthy, in a large organization, and (perhaps) in a bad marriage. A diagram depicts the trade-off between office status and pecuniary income. Winner-take-a-hike deceptions may distort returns to schooling, contribute to the glass ceiling, and motivate both discrimination and reverse discrimination to-ward women and ethnic minorities.

Date: 2003
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