“Fiduciary Capitalism,†the “Political Model of Corporate Governance,†and the Prospect of Stakeholder Capitalism in the United States

David M. Brennan
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David M. Brennan: Economics Department, Franklin and Marshall College, P.O. Box 3003, Lancaster, PA 17604-3003, USA, david.brennan@fandm.edu

Review of Radical Political Economics, 2005, vol. 37, issue 1, 39-62

Abstract: As progressive pension reforms seek to increase the opportunities for stakeholder involvement, they confront an existing set of class relations that by design exclude workers, retirees, and the state from real economic participation. This article argues that pension reforms must explicitly recognize the class underpinnings that jeopardize their success; proposes a workable, class-sensitive orientation for pension reforms; and includes the legislative context for governance reforms.

Keywords: pension funds; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:37:y:2005:i:1:p:39-62

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