Corporate Governance and the “Job Loss†Recovery

L. Josh Bivens and Christian Weller ()
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L. Josh Bivens: Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC, lbivens@epinet.org

Review of Radical Political Economics, 2005, vol. 37, issue 3, 293-301

Abstract: The recent recovery continued a trend that started in the mid-1970s of a growing divergence between capital and labor incomes. This trend appears to be largely due to a shift in the balance of corporate governance. A growing concentration of financial assets among institutional investors was juxtaposed by a declining unionization rate. Consequently, institutional investors had the incentives and increasingly the ability to allocate a growing share of corporate resources towards capital, particularly in the form of share repurchases and dividend payouts instead.

Keywords: profit share; income distribution; corporate governance; institutional investors; unionization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:37:y:2005:i:3:p:293-301

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