Finance as Servant? Lessons from New Deal Financial Reform

Ellen D. Russell
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Ellen D. Russell: School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, K1S 5B6, russell.ellen@gmail.com

Review of Radical Political Economics, 2008, vol. 40, issue 3, 250-257

Abstract: New Deal financial reforms wrestled with a dilemma that is instructive for contemporary advocates of economic change. A project of financial reform that puts constraints on finance may impair the profitability of financial capitalists, thus provoking financial capital to sabotage the financial reforms. This article discusses how the New Deal navigated this dilemma in hopes of gleaning insights useful for contemporary projects of financial reform.

Keywords: New Deal; Glass-Steagall Act; financial regulation; Banking Act of 1933 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:40:y:2008:i:3:p:250-257

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