Terrorism & Game Theory

Todd Sandler and Daniel Arce

Simulation & Gaming, 2003, vol. 34, issue 3, 319-337

Abstract: This keynote paper examines how game-theoretic analyses of terrorism have provided some policy insights that do not follow from nonstrategic analyses. Some new game-theoretic applications are indicated that concern terrorist targeting of businesses, officials, and the general public, where targets can work at cross-purposes as they attempt to deflect the attack. Other novel applications involve government choice among alternative antiterrorism policies, and government concessionary policy when terrorists are either hardliners or moderates in their viewpoint. Directions for future research are also indicated.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1046878103255492 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:simgam:v:34:y:2003:i:3:p:319-337

DOI: 10.1177/1046878103255492

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Simulation & Gaming
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().