Information perception and price dynamics in a continuous double auction

Juliette Rouchier and Stéphane Robin
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Stéphane Robin: Centre National de Recherche Scientifique

Simulation & Gaming, 2006, vol. 37, issue 2, 195-208

Abstract: The authors combine two methodologies—experimental economics and agent-based simulation—for the study of rational behavior of individuals in a market environment. The related market represents a competitive continuous double auction (CDA). Much of what is known about CDA is based on experimental research. The choice processes observed during behavior experiments are still not understood sufficiently. Therefore, in this article, the authors build an artificial society to analyze how perceptions of the market price affect individual strategies and collective behavior. More precisely, using an analytical science approach, they study learning (e.g., number of transactions memorized) and use of global versus local information. The result of their work mainly shows that the memory of past transactions is of little importance and that the revision of prices models the memory of agents adequately to demonstrate how rapidly price converges on an equilibrium state of the market.

Keywords: agent-based simulation; continuous double auction; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:simgam:v:37:y:2006:i:2:p:195-208

DOI: 10.1177/1046878106287947

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