Do Firms Pay For Perceived Risks At Work?

Christian Grund

Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), 2001, vol. 53, issue 3, 229-239

Abstract: The theory of compensating wage differentials is generally accepted. It states that firms have to pay wage bonuses for hazardous work. However, there is as yet no strong or even contrary evidence for compensating wage differentials in Germany. By estimating wage regressions with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and using individually perceived hazards of work accidents as a risk variable, evidence that firms do pay risk premiums for hazardous work are found even though other effects could dilute the existing wage bonuses. Taking into account these results, the incentives for German firms to invest in accident prevention are discussed in the context of the existing institutional conditions.

JEL-codes: J28 J31 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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