Managerial Versus Entrepreneurial Firms: The Benefits Of Separating Ownership And Control

Matthias Kräkel

Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), 2004, vol. 56, issue 1, 2-19

Abstract: Agency theory emphasizes that separating ownership and control can lead to inefficiencies in corporations, but the literature on strategic delegation points out that the owner will profit from this separation due to advantages from self-commitment. In this paper, both literatures are combined. The results show that strategic delegation can be even more profitable in the presence of agency problems. Furthermore, delegating takeover decisions to managers yields positive welfare effects.

Keywords: Agency Theory; Strategic Delegation; Takeovers. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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