Tax Collection, Transfers, and Corruption: the Russian Federation at the Crossroads

Manouchehr Mokhtari and Irina Grafova

Higher School of Economics Economic Journal Экономический журнал Высшей школы экономики, 2003, vol. 7, issue 1, 3-19

Abstract: After theoretically considering the problems of tax collection and corruption, we empirically analyzed our theoretical findings using a unique data set on Russian regional governments. Our theoretical models predict that the Russian system of transfers does not ensure an adequate level of incentives for tax collection by its subnationals and that, under certain condition, the numbers of tax inspection employees are inversely related to the tax collection. Empirical evidence strongly buttresses our theoretical findings and sheds significant light on one of the most contentious issue (intergovernmental fiscal relationship) in the Russian Federation.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:scn:025886:16537711

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