Optimal wages for politicians
Mohammad Reza Mirhosseini ()
Additional contact information
Mohammad Reza Mirhosseini: Department of Economics, Northern Illinois University, 515 Zulauf Hall, Dekalb, IL, 60115, USA
Southern Economic Journal, 2016, vol. 82, issue 3, 1004-1020
I consider a society that has to decide on the wage that it offers for an elected official. Potential candidates differ in their abilities, which determines their effectiveness in office and their opportunity cost. They consider the wage when deciding whether to enter as candidates, and if they do, how hard to campaign. The remuneration for the official that maximizes ordinary citizensâ€™ expected utility is a function of the proportion of competent voters who are better informed about the quality of the candidates and are not influenced by the campaign. I use the data on U.S. governor salaries over six decades to evaluate some implications of the model. Specifically, the proportion of the state's population with a bachelor's degreeâ€”a proxy for the proportion of competent votersâ€”is negatively correlated with the governorsâ€™ salaries when controlled for other factors.
JEL-codes: D72 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:82:3:y:2016:p:1004-1020
Access Statistics for this article
Southern Economic Journal is currently edited by Laura Razzolini
More articles in Southern Economic Journal from Southern Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Laura Razzolini ().