The Rules for the Jury of the Fryderyk Chopin Piano Competition as a Non Standard Voting Rule

Honorata Sosnowska
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Honorata Sosnowska: Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, 2013, issue 32, 23-31

Abstract: Game theoreticians usually deal with some standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some non standard more complex voting methods are used. In this paper we shall present the voting method used by the jury of the International Fryderyk Chopin Piano Competition. The voting method is very complicated and unclear. We present some unexpected effects of such a complicated voting rule.

Keywords: voting; classical music competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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