Normative Properties of Approval Voting - an Experimental Approach

Oliwia Szczupska
Additional contact information
Oliwia Szczupska: Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, 2013, issue 32, 33-42

Abstract: This paper analyzes the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates in the context of approval voting. Under a system of approval voting, a voter is allowed to vote for as many candidates as he wishes and the candidate(s) with the most approval votes wins. We say that a voter has voted sincerely if he prefers all approved above all non-approved candidates. There are certain assumptions regarding the principles of preference extension under which approval voting will never give a voter an incentive to vote insincerely. However, as presented in this paper, the experimental data show that even the most basic principles put forward in the literature are empirically demonstrated for only limited proportion among the examined groups.

Keywords: approval voting; sincere voting; preferences over sets of candidates; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://rocznikikae.sgh.waw.pl/p/roczniki_kae_z32_03.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgh:annals:i:32:y:2013:p:33-42

Access Statistics for this article

Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals is currently edited by Joanna Plebaniak, Beata Czarnacka-Chrobot

More articles in Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals from Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michał Bernardelli ().