Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game
Edoardo Marcucci (),
Marco Marini () and
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, 2005, issue 31, 28-45
We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.
Keywords: Road pricing; Political acceptability; Citizen-candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sot:journl:y:2005:i:31:p:28-45
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