No need to regulate airports with predominantly non-aeronautical revenues

Uwe Kratzsch and Gernot Sieg

European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, 2012, issue 52, 7

Abstract: This paper analyzes a profit-maximizing private airport with market power in providing aeronautical services. Our model implies that airports with ample capacity may voluntarily abstain from abusing their market power if non-aeronautical revenues are airports’ main source of income. In this case, a price regulation that is confined to the aviation business will be unnecessary from a welfare point of view.

Keywords: airport regulation; airport pricing; airline-airport strategic interaction; dual-till; non-aviation revenue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sot:journl:y:2012:i:52:p:7

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