The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games

Sylvain Béal, Aymeric Lardon, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Annals of Operations Research, 2012, vol. 196, issue 1, 27-51

Abstract: In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a generalization of the average tree solution defined and characterized by Herings et al. (Games Econ. Behav. 62:77–92, 2008 ) for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. It belongs to the precore of a restricted multi-choice game whenever the underlying multi-choice game is superadditive and isotone. We also link our solution with the hierarchical outcomes (Demange in J. Polit. Econ. 112:754–778, 2004 ) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average tree solution. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Average tree solution; Communication graph; (Pre-)core; Hierarchical outcomes; Multi-choice games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games (2012)
Working Paper: The Average Tree Solution for Multi-Choice Forest Games (2011)
Working Paper: The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-012-1150-1

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