 The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest GamesSylvain Béal, Aymeric Lardon, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal Post-Print from HAL Abstract: In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a generalization of the average tree solution defined and characterized by Herings et al. (Games Econ. Behav. 62:77-92, 2008) for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. It belongs to the precore of a restricted multi-choice game whenever the underlying multi-choice game is superadditive and isotone. We also link our solution with the hierarchical outcomes (Demange in J. Polit. Econ. 112:754-778, 2004) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average tree solution. Keywords: Multi-choice games; Average tree solution; Communication graph; (pre-)Core; Hierarchical outcomes; Multi-choice games. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2012, 196 (1), pp.27-51. ⟨10.1007/s10479-012-1150-1⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00690676 DOI: 10.1007/s10479-012-1150-1 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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