EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems

E. Algaba (), J. Bilbao () and Rene van den Brink ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2015, vol. 225, issue 1, 27-44

Abstract: This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2015

Keywords: Cooperative TU-game; Union stable system; Harsanyi dividend; Power measure; Harsanyi power solution; Myerson value; Position value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10479-012-1216-0 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:225:y:2015:i:1:p:27-44:10.1007/s10479-012-1216-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-012-1216-0

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:225:y:2015:i:1:p:27-44:10.1007/s10479-012-1216-0