Harsanyi Power Solutions for Games on Union Stable Systems

Encarnacion Algaba, Jesus Mario Bilbao and Rene van den Brink ()
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Encarnacion Algaba: University of Seville
Jesus Mario Bilbao: University of Seville

No 11-182/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in a publication in Annals of Operations Research , 2015, 225, 27-44.

This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the position value coincides with the Harsanyi power solution obtained for the influence power measure.

Keywords: Cooperative TU-game; Union stable system; Harsanyi dividend; Power measure; Harsanyi power solution; Myerson value; Position value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110182

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