Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility
Eric Bahel () and
Additional contact information
Eric Bahel: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Annals of Operations Research, 2023, vol. 322, issue 2, No 1, 539-563
Abstract This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer–seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer–seller pairs. For each such market, we examine the associated TU game. We first show that, in our context, an optimal matching can be obtained by considering the two-sided assignment market where each buyer–seller pair is allowed to use the mediation services of any middleman free of charge. Second, we prove that matching markets with middlemen are totally balanced: in particular, we show the existence of a buyer-optimal (seller-optimal) core allocation where each buyer (seller) receives her marginal contribution to the grand coalition. In general, the core does not exhibit a middleman-optimal allocation, not even when there are only two buyers and two sellers. However, we prove that in these small markets the maximum core payoff to each middleman is her marginal contribution. Finally, we establish the coincidence between the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
Keywords: Assignment games; Core; Competitive equilibrium; Matching markets; Matchmakers; Middlemen; 91A12; 91A43; 91B68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-022-05111-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Working Paper: Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:322:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-022-05111-6
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros
More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().