On the intersection between the imputation setand the Weber set

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz and Carles Rafels

Annals of Operations Research, 1998, vol. 84, issue 0, 120 pages

Abstract: This paper presents a characterization of the non-emptiness of the intersection between the imputation set and the Weber set. Tools from non-cooperative zero-sum finite games are used. We assign a matrix game to any cooperative game and the sign of the value of this matrix game is used for the characterization mentioned above. The cases of two or three players are discussed. Moreover, bounds and some particular cases for this value are studied. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: On the intersection between the imputation set and the weber set (1996)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1018928618125

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