On the intersection between the imputation set and the weber set

Fco. Javier Martinez de Albeniz Salas and Carlos Rafels Pallaro
Additional contact information
Carlos Rafels Pallaro: Universitat de Barcelona
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz

No 4, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: This paper presents a characterization of the non-emptiness of the intersection between the imputation set and the Weber set. Tools from non-cooperative zero-sum finite games are used. We assign a matrix game to any cooperative game and the sign of the value of this matrix game is used for the characterization mentioned above. The cases of 2 or 3 players are discussed. Moreover, bounds and some particular cases for this value are studied.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: On the intersection between the imputation setand the Weber set (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bar:bedcje:19964

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Espai de Recerca en Economia (ere.eco@ub.edu).