Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversedLinear ‐ Quadratic Stackelberg games
Thomas Vallee (),
Christophe Deissenberg and
Annals of Operations Research, 1999, vol. 88, issue 0, 217-232
The distinctive characteristic of a “Reversed Stackelberg Game” is that the leader playstwice, first by announcing his future action, second by implementing a possibly differentaction given the follower's reaction to his announcement. In such a game, if the leader usesthe normal Stackelberg solution to find (and announce) his optimal strategy, there is a strongtemptation for him to cheat, that is, to implement another action than the one announced. Inthis paper, within the framework of a standard discrete time Linear‐Quadratic DynamicReversed Stackelberg game, we discuss and derive the best possible open‐loop cheatingstrategy for an unscrupulous leader. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999
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Working Paper: Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversed Linear Quadratic Stackelberg games (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:88:y:1999:i:0:p:217-232:10.1023/a:1018982313949
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