Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversed Linear Quadratic Stackelberg games

Thomas Vallee, Christophe Deissenberg and T. Basar
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T. Basar: UIUC - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign [Urbana] - University of Illinois System

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Abstract: The distinctive characteristic of a "Reversed Stackelberg Game" is that the leader plays twice, first by announcing his future action, second by implementing a possibly different action given the follower's reaction to his announcement. In such a game, if the leader uses the normal Stackelberg solution to find (and announce) his optimal strategy, there is a strong temptation for him to cheat, that is, to implement another action than the one announced. In this paper, within the framework of a standard discrete time Linear–Quadratic Dynamic Reversed Stackelberg game, we discuss and derive the best possible open-loop cheating strategy for an unscrupulous leader.

Keywords: reversed Stackelberg game; cheating strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 1999, 88, pp.217-232. ⟨10.1023/A:1018982313949⟩

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Journal Article: Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversedLinear ‐ Quadratic Stackelberg games (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03193664

DOI: 10.1023/A:1018982313949

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