The economic development incentives game: an imperfect information, heterogeneous communities approach

Carlianne Patrick

The Annals of Regional Science, 2014, vol. 53, issue 1, 137-156

Abstract: The economic development incentives game developed in this paper extends the basic incentives game framework utilized in previous research by: (1) assuming heterogeneous communities with a priori unknown (to the communities or the firm) benefits and costs associated with the location, (2) providing a mechanism for communities to discover their true benefits and costs, and (3) allowing firms, as well as communities, to experience consequences associated with accepting a ‘bad deal’. Modeling an incentives competition game with these elements generates equilibrium behaviors and payoffs consistent with those observed in empirical and case studies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: H71; O18; R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00168-014-0621-5

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