A note on networks of collaboration in multi-market oligopolies

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard (), Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi

The Annals of Regional Science, 2014, vol. 53, issue 2, 325-335

Abstract: In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of collaboration networks in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We then present some results on efficient networks. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: C70; L13; L20; D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: A note on networks of collaboration in multi-market oligopolies (2014)
Working Paper: A Note on Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies (2014)
Working Paper: A note on networks collaboration in multi-market oligopolies (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00168-013-0577-x

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