A note on networks of collaboration in multi-market oligopolies

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard (), Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi
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Christophe Bravard: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Abstract: In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of collaboration networks in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We then present some results on efficient networks.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Annals of Regional Science, 2014, 53 (2), pp.325-335. ⟨10.1007/s00168-013-0577-x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on networks of collaboration in multi-market oligopolies (2014)
Working Paper: A Note on Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies (2014)
Working Paper: A note on networks collaboration in multi-market oligopolies (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01122998

DOI: 10.1007/s00168-013-0577-x

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