Individual and Institutional Corruption in European and US Healthcare: Overview and Link of Various Corruption Typologies

Margit Sommersguter-Reichmann (), Claudia Wild, Adolf Stepan, Gerhard Reichmann and Andrea Fried
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Margit Sommersguter-Reichmann: Karl-Franzens University of Graz
Claudia Wild: Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Health Technology Assessment
Adolf Stepan: Technical University Vienna
Gerhard Reichmann: Karl-Franzens University of Graz
Andrea Fried: Transparency International-Austrian Chapter

Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 2018, vol. 16, issue 3, No 3, 289-302

Abstract: Abstract In recent years, the fight against healthcare corruption has intensified. Estimates from the European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Network calculate an approximate €56 billion annual loss to Europe as a result of corruption. To promote understanding of the complexity and interconnection of corrupt activities, we aim to present healthcare-related corruption typologies of the European Union and European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Network. We subsequently link them to the typology of individual and institutional corruption introduced by Dennis Thompson in the context of investigating misconduct of US Congressional members. According to Thompson, individual corruption is the personal gain of individuals performing duties within an institution in exchange for nurturing private interests, while institutional corruption pertains to the failure of the institution in directing the individual’s behaviour towards the achievement of the institution’s primary purpose because the institutional design promotes the pursuit of individual goals. Effective anti-corruption activities not only require the enactment of anti-corruption laws but also the monitoring and, where appropriate, revision of institutional frameworks to prevent the undermining of the primary purposes of health systems or institutions. To gain further understanding of the similarities and differences of the three typologies, prime examples of corrupt activities in the health sector in the European Union and USA (along with their potential remedies) are provided. Linking corruption cases to Thompson’s typology revealed that many corrupt activities may show elements of both individual and institutional corruption because they are intertwined, partly overlap and may occur jointly. Hence, sanctioning individual actors only does not target the problem.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s40258-018-0386-6

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