Pricing, Procurement and Reimbursement Policies for Incentivizing Market Entry of Novel Antibiotics and Diagnostics: Learnings from 10 Countries Globally

Sabine Vogler (), Katharina Habimana, Manuel Alexander Haasis and Stefan Fischer
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Sabine Vogler: Gesundheit Österreich (GÖG/Austrian National Public Health Institute)
Katharina Habimana: Gesundheit Österreich (GÖG/Austrian National Public Health Institute)
Manuel Alexander Haasis: Gesundheit Österreich (GÖG/Austrian National Public Health Institute)
Stefan Fischer: Gesundheit Österreich (GÖG/Austrian National Public Health Institute)

Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 2024, vol. 22, issue 5, No 4, 629-652

Abstract: Abstract Background Fostering market entry of novel antibiotics and enhanced use of diagnostics to improve the quality of antibiotic prescribing are avenues to tackle antimicrobial resistance (AMR), which is a major public health threat. Pricing, procurement and reimbursement policies may work as AMR ‘pull incentives’ to support these objectives. This paper studies pull incentives in pricing, procurement and reimbursement policies (e.g., additions to, modifications of, and exemptions from standard policies) for novel antibiotics, diagnostics and health products with a similar profile in 10 study countries. It also explores whether incentives for non-AMR health products could be transferred to AMR health products. Methods This research included a review of policies in 10 G20 countries based on literature and unpublished documents, and the production of country fact sheets that were validated by country experts. Initial research was conducted in 2020 and updated in 2023. Results Identified pull incentives in pricing policies include free pricing, higher prices at launch and price increases over time, managed-entry agreements, and waiving or reducing mandatory discounts. Incentives in procurement comprise value-based procurement, pooled procurement and models that delink prices from volumes (subscription-based schemes), whereas incentives in reimbursement include lower evidence requirements for inclusion in the reimbursement scheme, accelerated reimbursement processes, separate budgets that offer add-on funding, and adapted prescribing conditions. Conclusions While a few pull incentives have been piloted or implemented for antibiotics in recent years, these mechanisms have been mainly used to incentivize launch of certain non-AMR health products, such as orphan medicines. Given similarities in their product characteristics, transferability of some of these pull incentives appears to be possible; however, it would be essential to conduct impact assessments of these incentives. Trade-offs between incentives to foster market entry and thus potentially improve access and the financial sustainability for payers need to be addressed. Graphical Abstract

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s40258-024-00888-y

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