Leviathan carbon taxes in the short run

Richard Tol

Climatic Change, 2012, vol. 114, issue 2, 409-415

Abstract: A cap is imposed on the carbon tax rate if the total tax revenue is not allowed to increase. Using recent data on the carbon-intensity of the economy and the overall tax take, I show that this cap constrains almost any climate policy in at least some countries. A larger number of countries, emitting a substantial share of global carbon dioxide, cannot fully participate if the carbon tax (or equivalent alternative regulation) is high enough to meet the 2 °C target. For that target, the carbon tax revenue in 2020 is greater than 10 % of total tax revenue in every country. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10584-012-0544-z

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