Pricing of uncertain certified emission reductions in a Chinese coal mine methane project with an extended Rubinstein-Ståhl model

Xiangyang Xu, Joanna Horabik () and Zbigniew Nahorski

Climatic Change, 2014, vol. 124, issue 3, 617-632

Abstract: The development of coal mine methane (CMM) projects is subject to various kinds of risk, one of these being their highly variable methane content. In this study, a new methodology is proposed to reflect the impact of this uncertainty on a negotiated Certified Emission Reduction (CER) price, which is based on the available information. To simulate a process of price negotiation the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game is utilized, where a buyer’s discount factor is unknown. It is assumed that a buyer’s willingness to accomplish price negotiations depends on the CER uncertainty. The bargaining model has been extended by introducing dependence of its three parameters on the probability of a failure to fulfil the contracted CER amount. To quantify this probability, we develop a conditional distribution given information on the point estimate of methane amount for the project under consideration, and on the distribution of available estimates from coal mines having similar characteristics. The proposed approach is applied to a particular CMM capture and utilization project in Anhui province, China. The results indicate that the uncertainty influence is significant, particularly when the credibility of a seller increases, i.e. the probability of a failure to fulfil the project decreases. The analysis can be of use to both negotiating parties at an early stage of a comprehensive CMM project planning. Copyright The Author(s) 2014

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10584-014-1057-8

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