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Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case

Fabien Gensbittel and Miquel Oliu-Barton ()
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Miquel Oliu-Barton: Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, CEREMADE

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2020, vol. 10, issue 4, No 3, 819-835

Abstract: Abstract Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (Math Oper Res 21:209–236, 1996a, Math Oper Res 21:237–251, 1996b), Rosenberg (Int J Game Theory 27:577–597, 1998) and De Meyer and Marino (Cahiers de la MSE 27, 2005) provided an explicit construction for optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the dependent case.

Keywords: Repeated games; Incomplete information; Recursive formula; Duality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-020-00347-y

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