Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case

Fabien Gensbittel and Miquel Oliu-Barton

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Abstract: Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (Math Oper Res 21:209–236, 1996a, Math Oper Res 21:237–251, 1996b), Rosenberg (Int J Game Theory 27:577–597, 1998) and De Meyer and Marino (Cahiers de la MSE 27, 2005) provided an explicit construction for optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the dependent case.

Keywords: Repeated games; Incomplete information; Recursive formula; Duality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-07
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Published in Dynamic Games and Applications, 2020, 10 (4), pp.819-835. ⟨10.1007/s13235-020-00347-y⟩

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Journal Article: Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03166411

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-020-00347-y

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