On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players

Pierre Bernhard () and Marc Deschamps
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Pierre Bernhard: INRIA-Sophia Antipolis Méditerranée

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2017, vol. 7, issue 3, No 2, 360-385

Abstract: Abstract We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game. As illustrations, we discuss some examples relating to oligopoly theory (Cournot, Stackelberg, cartel).

Keywords: Bernoulli process of entry; Market structure; Dynamic programming; 60K30; 91A06; 91A20; 91A50; 91B26; 91B70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: On dynamic games with randomly arriving players (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0197-z

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